

Education Report: Closing out the Christchurch School Rebuild

То:	Hon Chris Hipkins, Minister	Hon Chris Hipkins, Minister of Education					
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Purpose of Report

This report provides you with an update on the Christchurch Schools Rebuild (CSR) programme and the outcomes of an independent review on how to both close out the programme and transition back to business-as-usual asset management. This report seeks your direction on options to close out the CSR programme, which will inform the final scale of the programme. Funding the programme would remain subject to prioritisation through future Budget rounds.

Summary

- The Christchurch Schools Rebuild (CSR) programme was established in 2013 to build new, rebuild or repair 115 schools damaged by the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. The 115 schools serve around 45,000 students in the wider Christchurch area.
- In 2013, Cabinet noted that the programme would "support a better alignment of the education network with the needs of post-earthquake students" [CAB Min (13) 39/6A]. The CSR programme enables the wider transformation and renewal of education in Christchurch by building an optimised network to meet education demand.
- At the end of the programme, greater Christchurch will have a well-supported education network that will serve as a platform for student learning now and into the future.
- When established, it was noted that Education is a major source of economic activity and employment in greater Christchurch. The renewal of the education network has supported education as an economic enterprise, while the continued infrastructure investment has created employment opportunities and served as a continued economic stimulus.

Programme progress

5 CSR is in its eighth year of a ten-year programme. The programme has built new, rebuilt or refurbished 64 schools, benefitting around 23,000 students.

- 6 Currently 26 schools are in various stages of planning and design, 23 are in construction, and two are yet to enter the programme. We expect to complete a further 15 schools by June 2022. A comprehensive project status for the programme has been provided as **Annex 1**.
- The majority of the programme will be concluded by 2023. The remaining projects represent mainly larger secondary schools, which require phasing beyond the original 10-year timeframe so that schools can remain operational throughout delivery.
- 8 Cabinet set the original budget at \$1.137 billion [EGI Min (13) 26/2] and there was an Opex adjustment of \$14 million through Budget 14.
- In 2018, the mid-point review identified an adjustment of \$206 million, which included \$4 million of reallocated contingency, resulting in a net increase to the programme envelope of \$202 million. Following the mid-point adjustment, the current total programme envelope is \$1.353 billion. As at August 2021 \$861 million CapEx has been spent through the CSR programme.

Programme funding review

- The midpoint review increased the programme envelope to its current \$1.353 billion. The purpose of the 2018 review was to adjust for inflation and price escalation, which was specifically excluded from the original programme business case approved by Cabinet in 2013.
- It is now appropriate to consider how to both complete the programme, but also transition schools back to business-as-usual asset management, which includes identifying a plan to address ongoing and future upgrade liabilities.
- Earlier this year, the Ministry commissioned an independent review of the programme to establish the expected cost to complete the programme and identify the implications of transitioning CSR schools back into our business as usual asset management process.
- Through the review, we have identified four potential options to move forward with the CSR programme. The four options to close out the CSR programme reflect three categories of infrastructure work 'must' (essential work), 'should' (modernisation and upgrade that can be co-delivered efficiently with essential work) and 'could' (comprehensive modernisation and upgrade).

Option	Description	Additional CSR Funding Required (CapEx)	Risks	Implications
Option 1a*	What the programme <i>must</i> do – delivers essential remediation only, funding limited to the existing programme envelope. Remaining essential works will be prioritised and delivered by the NSRP.	9(2)(f)(iv)	Upgrade works deferred School expectations not fully met	Deferred liabilities will be prioritised against wider portfolio requirements, and may take up to 20 years to be delivered,
Option 1b*	What the programme <i>must</i> do – delivers essential remediation only completes all essential works under the CSR programme envelope.		Upgrade works deferred School expectations not fully met	Deferred liabilities will be prioritised against wider portfolio requirements, and may take up to 20 years to be delivered,
Option 2* [Ministry Preferred]	What the programme should do –delivers essential remediation works, with limited modernisation and upgrade where alignment with essential work offers economies.		Upgrade works deferred School expectations not fully met	Deferred liabilities will be prioritised against wider portfolio requirements, and may take up to 20 years to be delivered,
Option 3	What the programme <i>could</i> do – delivers the full scope of remediation plus modernisation and upgrade.		Possible perception of 'over investment' in Christchurch ahead of schools from other regions	School expectations are met and future liabilities for CSR schools are minimised.

^{*} These options transfer liabilities to the National School Redevelopment Programme. While this minimises funding required for the CSR programme, the liabilities will still need to be addressed.

- Since the inception of the CSR programme, we have taken many opportunities to align activities that provide maximum effectiveness and value for money through a combination of Workforce Support and Education Renewal funding. For example, to make the most of open and flexible learning spaces delivered through the CSR programme there is now in place a programme of work to ensure the corresponding transformation of teaching practice happens within schools. Two key initiatives funded from this programme are Grow Waitaha and Mana Whenua Facilitation, both strongly supported by the Principal's Associations.
- To address growing demand in supporting the greater Christchurch education sector, an additional 9(2)(f)(iv) will address an annual shortfall in Special Reasons Staffing (\$1.2m) and an annual Workforce Support shortfall (\$0.25m). Regardless of which option you chose, this funding is still required as the continuing education benefits of Grow Waitaha and Mana Whenua Facilitation extend beyond the support provided in the CSR programme.
- The decisions in this report will not impact your current Budget 2022 initiative. The decisions made will have financial impacts from Budget 2023 onwards.

Delegations for CSR Projects

- In May 2020, Cabinet delegated the financial authority to approve projects over \$35 million to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Education, provided the project could be funded within the programme envelope.
- 18 If you direct the Ministry to close out the CSR programme under an option that increases the programme envelope, we will also seek to extend the delegated financial authority to joint Ministers.

Linwood College

- In May 2020, Cabinet approved a further \$20 million of funding for the project at Linwood College, which includes the Kimihia Parents College and Early Childhood Centre. The current budget approved for the Linwood College project is \$66.7 million and is fully funded from the existing programme envelope.
- When Cabinet approved the current budget (\$66.7 million), we had not included an earlier minor works project to remove asbestos at the college. The asbestos removal occurred earlier in the CSR programme, and cost \$2.1 million.
- No additional funding is required, however the current delegation approved by Cabinet is now short by \$2.1 million. A correction is required which can be approved by joint Ministers.
- We will prepare a separate report to you and the Minister of Finance seeking approval for the updated Linwood College budget.

The Ministry of Education recommends you:

a. **note** that the Christchurch Schools Rebuild programme has a current programme envelope of \$1.353 billion.


Noted

b. **note** that at the conclusion of the Christchurch Schools Rebuild programme schools will transition back into the Ministry's business as usual asset management process, and outstanding liabilities will be managed through other property programmes.

Noted

c. **note** that without additional funding the Ministry will be unable to deliver the planned scope, and works that cannot be delivered within the current Christchurch Schools Rebuild programme envelope will be deferred until funding becomes available.

Noted



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e. **Direct** the Ministry to prepare a Cabinet paper seeking Cabinet agreement to programme settings for Option 2 or Option 3;

Agree Not Agree

Or

f. **Note** that Option 1a or 1b do not require further Cabinet decisions.

Noted

g. **Note** that closing out the Christchurch School Rebuild programme under Options 1a, 1b or 2 will mean the Ministry has future liabilities at some schools, and those liabilities will need to be prioritised at a national level.

Noted

h. **Note** that some schools in the Christchurch School Rebuild programme may raise issues if the programme is not closed out under Options 2 or 3.

Noted

i. **Note** that an additional \$1.225 million operating expenditure is required per annum for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 financial years to address an annual shortfall in Special Reasons Staffing (\$1.2m) and an annual Workforce Support shortfall (\$0.25m) for Christchurch schools.

Noted

j. **Note** that any additional funding for the Christchurch School Rebuild programme is subject to Cabinet approval and prioritisation through the annual Budget process.

Noted

k. **Note** that if you direct the Ministry to proceed under an option that requires an increased programme envelope, we will seek to extend the current Delegated Financial Authority to Joint Ministers for projects over \$35 million.

Noted

I. **Note** that, while the Linwood College project does not require any additional funding, a correct total budget approval is required.

Noted

m. **Note** we will prepare a separate Education Report to you and the Minister of Finance seeking approval for an updated budget for the Linwood College project.

Noted

n. **Not release** this education report as it contains advice pertaining to future Budget bids.

Release / Not release

Stoc

Scotty Evans

Deputy Secretary | Hautu, Te Puna Hanganga Matihiko

19/10/2021

Hon Chris Hipkins

Minister of Education

/ /

Closing out the programme requiring minimal additional funding

- 1. Cabinet approved the CSR programme in 2013. The intent of the programme was to not only restore the education system after the Christchurch Earthquakes, but also to "renew and modernise" [CAB Min (13) 39/6A].
- 2. The original programme budget was \$1.137 billion. In 2020, Cabinet approved a further \$206 million for the programme as part of the mid-point review, which increased the total programme Budget to \$1.353 billion.
- 3. It is possible to close out the programme within the current programme envelope of \$1.353 billion (**Option 1a**). However, this would require the Ministry to significantly reduce the scope of proposed works for some schools that are in the last few waves of the programme and will require the resetting expectations with affected schools.
- 4. To close out within the existing budget (**Option 1a**), the Ministry would review the remaining funds and potentially redistribute funding from non-essential components to ensure that all essential remediation occurs.
- 5. To address all essential infrastructure work at the CSR schools, around ^{9(2)(f)(iv)} of additional funding is required (**Option 1b**) from ministry baselines or new funding
- 6. **Options 1a and 1b** deliver the same essential works. The distinction is that under Option 1a works that cannot be funded within the existing programme envelope will need to be reconsidered as projects under the NSRP. Delivery would be subject to funding availability under the NSRP. Option 1b increases the CSR envelope by meaning essential works can be delivered within the current programme.
- 7. Both **Option 1a and 1b** risk not achieving the original intent of the CSR programme. There are significant reputational and stakeholder risks associated, due to the commitments already made or perceived to have been made.
- 8. There is currently 9(2)(f)(iv), including 9(2)(f)(iv) of contingency, of unspent but allocated funding from the current programme envelope. Under **Option 1a or 1b**, we will review, reprioritise and redistribute this funding to the most essential work. Works that could not be funded within the existing envelope would be deferred and transferred to other property programmes.
- 9. Option 1a and 1b would also result in disparate outcomes between schools that were completed under earlier waves of the programme. Schools that are entering the programme now would see funds targeted towards remediation work, compared to more extensive modernisation that was delivered at schools that are already complete. Not only would this approach not achieve the intended outcome of the CSR programme when it was established, but it would also contribute towards inequitable outcomes across the schools network.
- 10. If Option 1a or 1b is chosen to close out the CSR programme the Ministry would have ongoing liabilities in 21 CSR schools, which means future investment in these schools would be required. Future investment would need to be prioritised in line with the NSRP, and delivery would be subject to funding availability.

Seeking additional funding to close out the programme

- 11. **Option 2** and **Option 3** both require additional funding, which we would seek through the annual budget process as with the current CSR programme. However, to undertake the necessary planning and to be able to enter into contracts, we would require Government commitment to the overall funding top up required to close out the programme.
- 12. **Option 2** requires an increase of \$205 million, 9(2)(f)(iv)
- 13. All essential work would be delivered through **Option 2**, with the addition of some modernisation and upgrade works. There are still risks associated with meeting some school expectations and delivering equity across the programme. As with **Option 1**, the Ministry would need to make further investment in CSR schools to address outstanding modernisation and upgrade liabilities.
- 14. **Option 3**, while requiring the largest increase in project envelope at 9(2)(f)(iv) fully delivers both the intended outcome of the CSR programme and modernisation and upgrade work, and meets most school expectations.
- 15. **Options 2 and 3** offer several key benefits, including:
 - a. Meeting more stakeholder expectations
 - b. Supporting equitable outcomes for schools in the CSR programme
 - c. Minimising outstanding liabilities in the Christchurch school property portfolio
 - d. Utilising established delivery teams and contracts to deliver broader scope, which offers efficiencies in delivery and cost while minimising disruption to schools over the long term
 - e. No significant capital commitment required from the Crown is required immediately, as funding would be phased over the next 4-5 years
- 16. **Option 2** offers many of the same key benefits as Option 3, however these are balanced against an equitable approach to funding work across the national portfolio of school property. Essential infrastructure issues are addressed, with non-essential work delivered where efficient, but it does not inherently prioritise investment in Christchurch over the wider portfolio.
- 17. **Option 3** will accelerate condition works at Christchurch schools in the programme without prioritisation against schools at a portfolio level. This approach does mean schools in the CSR programme may see works delivered ahead of schools with similar infrastructure issues in the wider portfolio.


Educational Outcomes Assessment

- 18. There are educational benefits to work classified as 'non-essential'. At a high level, some of the educational benefits offered by undertaking **Options 2 and 3** include:
 - a. <u>Delivering learning environments aligned to the pedagogy of the school</u> In some cases under **Option 1** schools will have a mixture of new and old learning environments, which means some students will have classrooms designed to deliver the school's pedagogy while some do not.
 - b. <u>Delivering environments that reflect diversity</u> Principals and Boards may have planned for new facilities to support better outcomes for Māori or Pasifika ākonga and students that have learning support needs.
 - c. <u>Delivering facilities that will have wider community benefits</u> facilities, such as gymnasiums or technology teaching spaces, can also be used by the community.

19. A project level assessment of educational benefits offered by **Options 2 and 3** can be found in **Annex 2**.

Cashflow

- 20. CSR is a proven infrastructure programme with a strong track record of spend and delivery. As of 31 August 2021:
 - a. 64 schools are complete
 - b. 23 schools are in construction
 - c. 26 schools are in various stages of planning and design
 - d. 2 schools are yet to enter the programme
 - e. \$861 million CapEx has been spent through the CSR programme.
- 21. As an existing programme the Ministry is well positioned to convert any additional funding from draw down to spend quickly by utilising the existing governance and delivery frameworks.
- 22. The graph below summarises the funding profile of the programme to date and forecasts the ability to spend additional funding to close out the programme. Option 1 is shown in green, with Option 2 in navy, and Option 3 in brown. Greater detail on spend to date and forecast phasing is provided as **Annex 3**.



23. The Ministry is able to phase spend in different ways to respond to the Government's appetite for investment. It would be possible to commit to **Option 3**, but with a deferred spend profile (similar to **Option 2**) if this minimises the call on capital and spreads investment over a longer period.

Offset spend in other programmes

- 24. Additional works funded and delivered using the CSR programme by **Options 2 and 3** will offset funding required for the NSRP over a long term.
- 25. The reduction in funding required for the NSRP would not be felt in a single year, but over several years.
- 26. Conversely, if **Options 1a or 1b** are chosen to close out the programme, the liability and associated funding requirement will be transferred to other Ministry programmes, primarily the NSRP.

Conclusion

- 27. **Options 1a and 1b** deliver essential works, however they do not offer the educational benefits of wider investment, and there is a high likelihood that outstanding modernisation and upgrade work will be delivered over a longer time frame (10-20 years).
- 28. **Option 2** offers most of the key benefits delivered by **Option 3**, but this can be balanced against a need to invest in other areas of New Zealand. **Options 2 and 3** utilise the existing programme in Christchurch to accelerate delivery for schools in the programme.
- 29. Option 2 is the Ministry recommended option, as it delivers the intended scope of the original programme, meets stakeholder expectations, is balanced against a need to invest in other areas of New Zealand, and does not require any immediate capital injection from the Crown. It utilises our resources and learning from the established CSR programme to deliver efficiently and effectively with equitable investment across the wider property portfolio.

Completion by 2023

- 30. A small number of projects are now expected to be completed after June 2023. The remaining projects represent mainly larger secondary schools, which require phasing beyond the original 10-year timeframe. Completion of these projects will be staged so the schools can remain operational and disruption to students is limited.
- 31. These larger more complex schools that will not be completed by the end of December 2023 are Burnside High School, Christchurch Girls' High School, Papanui High School, and Riccarton High School.
- 32. There are a further two schools that are yet to enter the programme and are not expected to be completed prior to the end of June 2023. Chisnallwood Intermediate was proposed for closure, following consultation a decision was made not to proceed. However, the decision documented stated that a review of education provision will inform next steps for Chisnallwood Intermediate and for it to be undertaken in 2021. This review has commenced. For the former van Asch Deaf Education Centre, now part of Ko Taku Reo, entry to the CSR programme has been deferred until decisions are made around nationwide provision of deaf education.
- 33. At two other schools, Ferndale School and TKKM o Te Whanau Tahi the expected scope of works has significantly changed from that previously planned and the programme has been reforecast accordingly.
- 34. The Ministry will rephase the programme spend and delivery forecasts subject to your preferred option to close out the programme, and the Government's preferred funding profile for that option.

Next Steps

- 35. Any increases to the CSR programme envelope would require Cabinet approval, and funding to meet that envelope would be prioritised through the annual Budget process.
- 36. Once you have provided direction on your preferred option to close out the CSR programme, we will undertake next steps determined by the chosen option:

- a. Option 1 Ministry will commence descoping projects. We will also prepare a communications strategy to deliver key information to schools about their projects and any questions they have about descoping and essential property work.
- b. Option 2– we will prepare a draft Cabinet paper seeking agreement to the revised project envelope. We will also prepare a communications strategy to support affected schools to understand why some of their property liabilities will not be met at this time.
- c. Option 3 we will prepare a draft Cabinet paper seeking agreement to the revised programme envelope. It will include estimated draw down phasing to indicate impact on Crown funding.

Special Reasons Staffing

- 37. Since the inception of the CSR programme, we have taken many opportunities to align activities that provide maximum effectiveness and value for money through a combination of Workforce Support and Education Renewal funding. For example, to make the most of open and flexible learning spaces delivered through the CSR programme there is now in place a programme of work to ensure the corresponding transformation of teaching practise happens within schools. Two key initiatives funded from this programme are Grow Waitaha and Mana Whenua Facilitation, both strongly supported by our Principal's Associations.
- 38. The committed contribution from the Christchurch Workforce Support package specifically relates to the following support categories of the appropriation:
 - a. Provide professional support to Principals and Teachers
 - b. Retraining opportunities for teaching staff to up skill in an area that responds to emerging needs of Christchurch students.
- 39. Workforce Support also funds other activity within the renewal work programme to support schools and early childhood services working collaboratively to look beyond their individual institutions and consider how to provide the best quality education to all local children and young people in their communities.
- 40. EAP and many other wellbeing initiatives are supported through the Workforce Support budget and are managed regionally.
- 41. Workforce Support is also providing release time to Principals and Teachers involved in the Special Schools Network programme, especially where it relates to the personal and professional growth of those staff. This is making a real difference to the way our education leaders think about, practice and reflect on collaboration and inclusive practice. While Education Renewal funds specific projects, these would not be as successful without the release time being available for the staff to attend, which came from Workforce Support.
- 42. This regional funding also supports short-term release time or additional staffing to assist boards and school leadership teams in the development of curriculum redesign in response to environment (earthquake rebuild) and pedagogical practice, another initiative keenly supported by our Principal's Associations and schools. Our budget is fixed and stretched due to increasing demand as the CSR programme has matured and delivery accelerated. We have much more work yet to do to deliver transformational change in the education sector in greater Christchurch.

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Risks

- 44. The Ministry has undertaken a risk analysis and mitigation review as part of the close out review. This identified that the most significant risks to the programme are stakeholder expectations and the impact of public perception on the programme.
- 45. To manage these risks, the following mitigations have been implemented:
 - a. The Ministry facilitates communication with stakeholders in both directions to create a shared understanding of the CSR programme moving forward.
 - b. The Ministry works hard with partners and schools to identify where informal commitments have been made publicly and to manage expectations closely with schools on scope change.
 - c. The Ministry works with stakeholder and partners, offering advice and guidance, and utilising shared principles to make similar decisions across school complaints to ensure that media coverage presents a balanced view of the CSR programme.
- 46. The full risk analysis and mitigation review can be found as **Annex 4**.

Aligning CSR investment within the context of wider portfolio investment

- 47. Given the scale of investment in Christchurch over the past eight years, the allocation of further funding to the CSR programme could be perceived as inequitable when other regions of New Zealand have not received comparable levels of funding for school modernisation and upgrade. It should be noted however that this level of funding resulted from the damage and destruction caused by the earthquakes which was and remains at an unprecedented scale in comparison to any other national disasters.
- 48. This is mitigated by the Ministry's National School Redevelopment Programme, which delivers upgrade and condition works to schools facing infrastructure pressures that cannot be met by 5 Year Agreement (5YA) funding alone. However, as the programme is in earlier stages and is less visible compared to CSR, there may still be some concerns from other schools and communities.
- 49. Option 2 offers a compromise between delivering the full intent of the CSR programme and balancing the need for investment in other areas of New Zealand. Some outstanding works will need to be delivered by other property programmes; however these will be managed by prioritising them against national priorities.

50. The cost implications of each option are summarised in table one.

Table One: Summary of additional funding required for each CSR Close Out option

Scenario	Additional funding required	Risk provision
Option 1a – Must Within current envelope	9(2)(f)(iv)	
Option 1b - Must		
Option 2 - Should [Ministry recommended]		
Option 3 - Could		

^{*} There is currently 9(2)(f)(iv) , of unspent but allocated funding from the current programme envelope. Under this option, the Ministry will review, and may reprioritise and redistribute the unspent funding to address the most essential works first.

- 51. If Option 2 or 3 is progressed and additional funding is required, the only immediate action required would be a Cabinet commitment to increasing the overall programme budget and extending the existing delegated financial authority to Joint Ministers. No immediate additional funding would be required. However, the Ministry would be able to commence design works for projects based on that future funding commitment.
- 52. The Ministry would then prepare its CSR budget bids for Budget 22 and outyears as usual. However, the funding sought each year would be higher than if we continued with Option 1.
- 53. We would only seek to draw down funding as it was required to deliver the projects. We would achieve this through a slight increase in annual CSR bids from 2023/24 [per the chart above], minimising the impact on Crown funding.

Impact of Option 1 on Ministry baseline

- 54. If the CSR programme is closed out under Option 1a, there would be no additional cost to the Crown through the CSR budget bids.
- 55. However, the upgrade and modernisation work required at CSR schools would remain a liability for the Ministry. Work required would instead be transferred to the Ministry's other property programmes, primarily the NSRP.
- 56. The NSRP currently relies on Ministry baseline funding for all condition scope. By deferring upgrade and modernisation from the CSR programme, the liability will need to be met from Ministry baseline.
- 57. Baseline funding is limited, and the majority of baseline has been committed for the next few years. Outstanding work at CSR schools would need to be prioritised against other projects in the NSRP and may take some time to deliver. In this case, the Ministry would develop a proactive communications plan to communicate with schools about the future of their project and, where appropriate, how some scope may be transitioned into our BAU property programmes.

Interface with Budget 22

- 58. The Ministry has submitted a Budget 22 bid for \$88 million (CapEx) and \$23.1 million (OpEx) of funding for the Christchurch Schools Rebuild programme.
- 59. While this bid is subject to scaling as part of Budget 22 negotiations, the funding sought through Budget 22 would not change as a result of the option you choose in this report.
- 60. Following your direction, the Ministry will prepare a Cabinet paper that seeks agreement to the programme level settings and scope.
- 61. This paper would not seek a Budget 22 pre-commitment, as the chosen option does not require any additional funding in the 2022/23 financial year.
- 62. Any option that would require additional funding for the CSR programme would mean investment is sought through future Budgets over a number of years. The value of funding sought each year would be aligned to construction and project delivery.

Proactive Release

63. We recommend that this Education Report is not released at this time. This is because it contains information that is under active consideration. The information in this briefing will also inform future Budget bids.



This A3 provides a summary of what additional scope would be delivered at each school, and an analysis of the education benefits offered by the additional investment.

Annex 3 – Spend to date, and forecast spend

	FY 13/14	FY 14/15	FY 15/16	FY 16/17	FY 17/18	FY 18/19	FY 19/20	FY 20/21	FY 21/22	FY 22/23	FY 23/24	FY 24/25	FY 25/26	Total
Funding - baseline	23.67	44.98	47.27	47.63	0.00	64.60	22.64	50.91	88.03	16.49				406.22
Funding - baseline (Midpoint Review)										40.00				40.00
Funding - insurance proceeds		6.09	43.37	78.58	36.50									164.53
Funding - capital injection (Original)					99.02	68.50	96.97	79.31						343.79
Funding - capital injection (Midpoint Review)							V/-	7.42	56.00	87.58				151.00
9(2)(f)(iv)						1								
Total	23.67	51.07	90.64	126.21	135.51	133.10	119.61	137.64	144.03	144.07	9(2)(f)(iv)			
Non- Development funds spent ¹														247.79

¹ Relates to PPP schools funded from CSR, Furniture and equipment and other operating costs.

Annex 4 - Risk Analysis and Mitigations for CSR Programme

Risk	Mitigating Themes
It is challenging maintaining control given the significant scope flexibility, differences in school expectations and unknown building conditions at many schools and this may lead to varying expectations of levels of scope and funding as well as potential perceptions of inequity. School expectations including the degree of modernisation that they can expect can be interpreted widely and may lead to varying expectations of levels of scope and funding as well as potential perceptions of inequity.	 ✓ Funding is used for various projects that are currently in different stages, rather than allocating funding to specific projects from start to finish. ✓ There are monthly CSR programme updates for early warning of impacts both positive and negative for SE&S colleagues. ✓ MOE works to ensure continuous alignment and co-working on delivering education benefits that align and support GCERP objectives. ✓ Facilitated communication with stakeholders in both directions to create a shared understanding of the CSR programme moving forward. ✓ Funding is used for various projects that are currently in different stages, rather than allocating funding to specific projects from start to finish. ✓ MOE works jointly within Ministry and with stakeholders and partners to support the smooth transition of our people, schools, communities and ākonga to working in a different way and we communicate these changes clearly. ✓ There are a number of proactive opportunities for positive media coverage i.e announcements of redevelopments, behind the scenes tours, opening events.
Announced in conjunction with the news of proposed closures or mergers of a number of Christchurch schools, the original plans for Christchurch were met with significant opposition from the education sector and the wider community.	✓ The Ministry has worked hard to put things right and rebuild trust and confidence in Christchurch
Schools still in the programme use the media to complain about the scope of the works on their redevelopments	 ✓ MOE works with stakeholder and partners, offering advice and guidance, and utilising shared principles to make similar decisions across school complaints to ensure that media coverage presents a balanced view of the CSR programme. ✓ Individual schools talking about the success of their redevelopments attracts positive media coverage ✓ Funding is used for various projects that are currently in different stages, rather than allocating funding to specific projects from start to finish.
The Close out Review proposal is likely to increase visibility of the CSR programme and intensify stakeholder perception of CSR's effectiveness to date and in the future given that this is a draw on Government funds following the global coronavirus outbreak	 ✓ There is now and will be in the future, proactive communication with stakeholders, partners and public on the successes, benefits delivered to date and future challenges of CSR that drive the need for additional funds ✓ MOE ensures that it conveys accurate and easy-to-understand information to our people and stakeholders about the progress of the CSR programmes, including key milestones and developments

- MOE facilitates communication with stakeholders in both directions to create a shared understanding of the CSR programme moving forward.
- ✓ Funding is used for various projects that are currently in different stages, rather than allocating funding to specific projects from start to finish.
- ✓ Continually identifying proactive opportunities for positive media coverage i.e. announcements of redevelopments, behind the scenes tours, opening events.
- ✓ Monthly CSR programme update for early warning of impacts both positive and negative for SE&S colleagues. Ensure continuous alignment and co-working on delivering education benefits that align and support GCERP objectives.

The additional funds requested by MOE are seen as unnecessary and / or the CSR programme is not seen as successful or delivering equitable outcomes across the Christchurch education network

- ✓ The CSR programme has a primary focus on earthquake damage, structural strength, weather tightness, infrastructure repairs and modernisation
- ✓ We still expect to complete the remaining schools in the programme by the end of 2023, except for some larger secondary schools where we are staging construction so that the schools can remain fully operational.
- ✓ At the end of the programme, greater Christchurch will have one of the most modern schooling networks in the country, which will serve as a platform for student learning well into the future.
- ✓ Manage all schools' expectations on scope change and CSR objectives, noting some changes always needed be funded separately such as through 5YA.
- ✓ Monthly CSR programme update for early warning of impacts both positive and negative for SE&S colleagues. Ensure continuous alignment and co-working on delivering education benefits that align and support GCERP objectives.
- Convey accurate and easy-to-understand information to our people and stakeholders about the progress of the CSR programmes, including key milestones and developments
- ✓ Facilitate communication with stakeholders in both directions to create a shared understanding of the CSR programme moving forward.
- Monthly CSR programme update for early warning of impacts both positive and negative for SE&S colleagues.
 Ensure continuous alignment and co-working on delivering education benefits that align and support GCERP objectives.
- Support the smooth transition of our people and stakeholders to working in a different way and communicate these changes clearly.
- ✓ Continue identifying proactive opportunities for positive media coverage i.e. announcements of redevelopments, behind the scenes tours, opening events.

Informal commitments have been made or implied which may lead to varying expectations of levels of scope and funding as well as potential perceptions of inequity.

- ✓ MOE works hard with partners and schools to identify where informal commitments have been made publicly and to manage expectations closely with schools on scope change.
- ✓ Funding is used for various projects that are currently in different stages, rather than allocating funding to specific projects from start to finish.